(Though there’s another sticky problem here, and that’s that Bragg actually isn’t an average consumer, he’s a lawyer. And the law essentially says he has to argue his case, using the facts about him, so that might make this argument a little — or maybe even a lot — harder.)

is “own your own virtual land” any more or less obviously incoherent than “own your own website?”. In any event, if the point is that those with a limited understanding of the law will not understand the numerus clausus principle, there is every chance that they will also not understand many of the other aspects of ownership that make it distinct from a contractual right. The impression conveyed by “own your own virtual land” is, I should suggest, the same as that created by “own your own website”: that one will be provided with a service that gives one a sense of ownership. That is reinforced by the Terms of Service, which make it as clear as ever it could be that the right acquired is a contractual right in respect of which Linden Lab have considerable contractual powers, inconsistent with literal ownership of virtual land by their customers, but, if exercised sparingly (as they are), and only for good reason, entirely consistent with a service that gives a strong sense of ownership.

In summary, if one understands the law well enough to be able to understand the distinction between a service giving a general sense of ownership and literal ownership, then one can only be expected to realise that what is on offer is the former, not the latter, since the latter simply does not make sense in the context.